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Comments
Physician-Assisted Death with
Dignity: Expanding Palliative Care in
Rhode Island
Camille Caron Capraro*
INTRODUCTION

Properly addressing palliative care and physician-assisted
death (PAD) is a delicate, yet complicated, and even controversial,
issue.1 Some see PAD as a dignified choice, while others see it as
encouraging suicide. States have begun to grapple with PAD in a
multitude of ways, primarily through legislation.2 American law
accords the power to prevent or regulate PAD to the states, which
also includes an individual’s right to refuse to take necessary
steps to preserve his or her life.3 When a state determines how
*
J.D. Candidate, 2019, Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. The pro-PAD side of the debate has mostly done away with the term
“physician-assisted suicide” and has instead used: “hastened death,”
“compassionate care,” “end of life option,” and “death with dignity.” See
Joseph B. Straton, Physician Assistance with Dying: Reframing the Debate;
Restricting Access, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 475, 476 (2006). Eliminating
the term “suicide” provides more appeal to the public when considering this
issue. See id. For example, legislative proposals in Rhode Island have used
“compassionate care” when referring to this topic. See H.B. 7297, 2018 Leg.,
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2018).
2. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
3. Id. (acknowledging that a medical patient has the right to refuse
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best to address PAD versus continued life-saving treatment, it is
necessary to balance the state’s interest in maintaining and
preserving life with the individual’s interest in autonomy.4 In
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, a landmark
case regarding a patient’s right to die and the right to refuse
medical treatment, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the
“interests at stake . . . are more substantial, both on an individual
and societal level, than those involved in a run-of-the-mine civil
dispute.”5 States have a legitimate interest in protecting and
preserving human life and preventing suicide, but, on the other
side, an individual has a right to bodily autonomy, specifically, to
have a choice to control the destiny of his or her own body.6
Indeed, in the case of a terminally ill patient, the state’s interest
in maintaining and preserving life directly conflicts with an
individual’s interest in autonomy—specifically, relieving oneself
from undue pain and suffering.7
To understand the arguments and discussions surrounding
PAD, one must first understand the distinction between certain
commonly used terminology. This Comment will use the term
“right to die” instead of “euthanasia.” The term right to die in the
PAD context refers to individuals rationally choosing to end their
lives after careful deliberation.8 “Euthanasia,” on the other hand,
involves physician-made decisions that will ultimately shorten a
patient’s life based on the belief that death would be more
beneficial to the patient rather than the patient continuing in his
or her present state.9 Essentially, euthanasia connotes a focus on
the physician and the physician’s perspective, whereas right to die
unwanted medical treatment).
4. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.
5. Id. at 283. This case primarily dealt with establishing an
evidentiary standard. Id. A surrogate or guardian may make an end of life
decision for another person under certain circumstances if there is “clear and
convincing” evidence that the person wants this treatment. Id.
6. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992);
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.
7. See Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123,
1128–29, 1131–33 (1997).
8. See Katherine A. Wingfield & Carl S. Hacker, Physicians-Assisted
Suicide: An Assessment and Comparison of the Statutory Approaches Among
the States, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 13, 16–17 (2007).
9. JOHN KEOWN, EUTHANASIA, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN ARGUMENT
AGAINST LEGALISATION 10 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
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shifts that focus to the individual’s perspective and that person’s
individual right to make a choice regarding his or her body.10
This Comment argues that Rhode Island should enact
legislation allowing PAD in very specific instances related to
terminally ill patients.11 As Part I shows, the United States
Supreme Court has concluded that there is no constitutional right
to PAD, but this leaves room for the states to enact PAD
protections by statute.12 Part II demonstrates that Rhode Island’s
current legal posture on the issue of PAD is antiquated and
against individual interests, and thus, should be repealed and
replaced.13 This Comment further argues that Rhode Island
should adopt a law allowing PAD in specific circumstances for
terminally ill patients because it is an effective way to balance the
state’s interest in protecting its citizens and preserving life
against an individual’s right to choose, and bodily autonomy.14
PAD comports with a physician’s role as healer, posing no threat
to the integrity of the medical community.15 Strict procedural
safeguards within PAD legislation alleviate the possible risk of
abuse or coercion, and data from Oregon, the first state to legalize
PAD, clearly demonstrates the success of procedural safeguards in
practice.16 Therefore, this Comment concludes that Rhode Island
should pass legislation that is similar to the Lila Mansfield
Sapinsley Compassionate Care Act (LMSCCA), which is a
proposed legislation that is currently being considered by the
Rhode Island legislature, and would give a terminally ill patient
the right to opt for PAD if certain criteria were met.17

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See id.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part I.A–B.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B.3.
See infra Part II.C.
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I.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS REJECTED A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH

A. Right to Refuse Unwanted Medical Treatment Does Not
Extend to a Right to Hasten Death
Many supporters for legalization of PAD contend that the
right to die is protected by substantive due process and equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.18 Although PAD is not an enumerated right in the
Constitution, the Due Process Clause is often the basis for
protecting certain rights that are not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution, but are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” or
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”19 While the
United States Supreme Court recognizes a constitutionally
protected right of a competent person to refuse unwanted medical
treatment,20 the Court refused to recognize a corresponding
constitutional right of a terminally ill patient to choose to die with
assistance from a physician.21 Nevertheless, the lack of a
constitutionally protected right to PAD does not preclude the
states from protecting that right on their own accord.22
The question of whether the right to die and advance
directives23 are constitutionally protected was first addressed in
Cruzan, where the Court held that “a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
18.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723–24 (1997); Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797–98 (1997).
19.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
324–25 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
20.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). The
Supreme Court has found protected liberty interests in a number of personal
decisions determined to be essential to an individual’s personal dignity and
autonomy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
21.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728; Quill, 521 U.S. at 807–09.
22.
See infra Part II.B.; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“States are presently undertaking extensive and serious
evaluation of physician-assisted suicide . . . . In such circumstances, the . . .
challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding . . .
liberty interests is entrusted to the laboratory of the States.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
23.
“Advance directive” is defined as “[a] written declaration of health
care decisions made in advance of incapacity.” Living Will (Advance
directive), THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012).
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medical treatment,” even if such treatment is lifesaving; this
liberty interest can outweigh the legitimate state interest in
preservation of life.24 The facts in the case presented an issue
because a serious car accident left the patient on life-support, and
thus, deemed incompetent to make medical decisions; her parents
sought a court order to remove the life-support.25 The Court
explained that an individual has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in deciding to end her own life support, but when a
patient is incompetent, the state’s interests at stake are more
compelling.26 There, the removal of life-sustaining treatment by
third parties justified the imposition of heightened evidentiary
requirements, which further supports the position that the patient
could have made this decision if he or she was medically
competent to do so.27 While the Cruzan holding appears to allow
for a broad categorization of the liberty interest involved—that
being the right to die in general—the Court subsequently clarified
that the right in Cruzan is narrowly defined as the
“constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition.”28
In Washington v. Glucksberg, plaintiffs challenged a
Washington statute prohibiting PAD under the Due Process
24.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278–79 (holding that due process does not
require the state to repose judgment on matters concerning the right to
refuse treatment with anyone but the patient herself). In Cruzan, Justice
Scalia noted the “difficult, indeed agonizing, questions that are presented by
the constantly increasing power of science to keep the human body alive for
longer than any reasonable person would want to inhabit it.” Id. at 292
(Scalia, J., concurring).
25.
Id. at 265 (majority opinion).
26. Id. at 281–84.
27.
Id. at 281. The Court imposed a “clear and convincing” evidentiary
standard when a surrogate or third party makes an end of life decision for an
incompetent patient. Id. at 284. Cruzan remained in a vegetative state on
life-support for almost eight years before her parents came up with sufficient
additional evidence to halt artificial nutrition and hydration. D. KELLY
WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 94, 99 (6th ed. 2016). She died twelve days after the feeding tube
was removed. Id. The hospital staff who had cared for her for seven years
were deeply troubled by this outcome because they believed it would have
been easier to cope had she been allowed to die quickly by lethal injection.
Id.
28.
Cruzan, 497 U.S at 284; see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
722–23 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807–09 (1997).
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Clause on the grounds that it violated the protected interest of
individual autonomy and, like the plaintiffs in Cruzan, the right to
hasten one’s death.29 The Glucksberg opinion emphasized that
the holding in Cruzan was not solely deduced from concepts of
bodily autonomy, but rather—as all due process cases demand—
an examination into “our [n]ation’s history, legal traditions, and
practices.”30 Justice Rehnquist defined the liberty interest
narrowly, explaining that the right to assistance for suicide is not
a value that is deeply rooted in the nation’s history.31 He noted
that history actually points the opposite way: “for over 700 years,
the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or
otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.”32
Moreover, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on Cruzan,
and stated that there is an important distinction between
withdrawing life support (as was the case in Cruzan), and opting
to take medication to end one’s own life, which ultimately becomes
the proximate cause of death.33 PAD involves doctors giving
drugs to end a life, whereas Cruzan involved taking away a lifegiving mechanism, which resulted in the patient’s death.34 The
law regards forcing medical treatment as the equivalent of
battery, while assisting suicide has never received the same
treatment.35
In the companion case to Glucksberg, Vacco v. Quill, plaintiffs
challenged a New York statute prohibiting PAD under the Equal
Protection Clause.36 The contention was that it is unfair for
family members to be permitted to take an individual off life
support, but that an individual cannot make that decision for his

29.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 708.
30. Id. at 710.
31. Id. at 710–11.
32. Id. “The earliest American statute explicitly to outlaw assisting
suicide was enacted in New York in 1828.” Id. at 715.
33. Id. at 725–26. “The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of
another may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal
protection.” Id. at 725.
34. Id. at 725; see Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–
79 (1990).
35. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725.
36. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 796–97 (1997). Quill was argued and
decided on the same days as Glucksberg. See Quill, 521 U.S. at 808–09.
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or herself with PAD.37 The Court found this argument no more
convincing than the one in Glucksberg, and upheld New York’s
statute, concluding that banning PAD while allowing refusal of
life-sustaining treatment did not treat patients differently from
one another or “draw any distinctions between persons.”38 The
Court stated, “[e]veryone, regardless of physical condition, is
entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical
treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide.”39
Ultimately, the Court refused to recognize a constitutionally
protected fundamental right to determine the time and manner of
one’s own death under either the Due Process Clause or the Equal
Protection Clause.40 Since the liberty interest of PAD is not
considered a fundamental right, the Constitution only requires
that a ban on PAD be rationally related to legitimate government
interests, such as preserving life.41
B. States May Recognize a Right to Physician-Assisted Death
Justice Brandeis famously stated, “[i]t is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”42 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court defers
to the states to legalize or regulate PAD, and some states have
begun to legally permit PAD.43 Although Glucksberg and Quill
were decided without any dissenting opinions, the majority
opinions in both cases leave open the option of legal protection for
PAD at the state level, arising either under state constitutions or
state legislative authorization; many states are taking the avenue

37. Id. at 800.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728; Quill, 521 U.S. at 800.
41. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728. In Glucksberg, the government’s
interest included protecting medical ethics and vulnerable groups, such as
the disabled and elderly; the court concluded that this was sufficient
justification to pass a rational basis test. Id. at 731–32, 735.
42. New State Ice Co. v. Liebermann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
43. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737; see Wingfield & Hacker, supra note 8, at
23–44.
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of legislative reform.44 Thus, states retain the power to regulate
PAD, but must ensure that any new legislation is consistent with
United States Supreme Court rulings.45
Beginning in 1994, five states and the District of Columbia
have exercised their right to regulate and legalize PAD through
legislation, and one state has exercised this right by means of a
court ruling.46 The increasing number of states that have
expressly legalized the right to choose to die by enacting PAD
statutes demonstrates a national shift in public opinion towards
acceptance of this right.47
In November 1994, Oregon became the first state to legalize
PAD when voters passed the Oregon Death with Dignity Act
(DWDA) by a narrow margin of fifty-one percent to forty-nine
percent.48 The modern idea of DWDA was initially met with
public resistance, particularly in the form of a legal injunction
that stemmed from a constitutional challenge under the
Fourteenth Amendment, in addition to a referendum effort to
force repeal.49 Yet, in November 1997, Oregon voters confirmed
their support by voting in favor of the Act a second time by a
margin of sixty percent to forty perfect, an even larger majority
44. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Privacy and the Alaska Constitution: Failing to Fulfill the
Promise, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 29, 36 (2003); see Kathryn L. Tucker, The Death
with Dignity Movement: Protecting Rights and Expanding Options After
Glucksberg and Quill, 82 MINN. L. REV. 923, 926 (1998) [hereinafter Tucker,
The Death with Dignity Movement].
45. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). Gonzalez is the most
recent Supreme Court decision to affirm the states’ authority to legalize and
regulate PAD. Id. at 274–75.
46. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1213 (Mont. 2009); Wingfield &
Hacker, supra note 8, at 23–44. States that legally permit PAD include
Oregon, Washington, Montana, Vermont, California, Colorado, and the
District of Columbia. See infra notes 49–54 and accompanying text.
47. See Wingfield & Hacker, supra note 8, at 23–44. “Expressly”
legalizing PAD, as it is used in this Comment, refers to a state affirmatively
allowing for PAD whether it be through common law or statute.
48. Eli Stutsman, Twenty Years of Living with the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act, 30 GPSOLO 49, 50 (2013) (describing the ballot measure that
created the Oregon Death with Dignity Act).
49. Id. Implementation of the DWDA was delayed by injunction until
1997. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1997), vacating 869 F.
Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994). The Ninth Circuit found federal courts did not
have jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims and vacated the injunction. See
id.
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than the initial ballot.50
Oregon’s DWDA became the catalyst for other states to invoke
their right to legalize and regulate PAD. Washington voters
approved an almost identical initiative in 2008;51 Montana
permitted PAD by court ruling in 2009;52 Vermont passed the End
of Life Choices Act in 2013; California passed the End of Life
Option Act in 2015; and both Colorado and the District of
Columbia passed legislation permitting PAD in 2016.53
II. RHODE ISLAND SHOULD LEGALIZE PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH

A. Rhode Island’s Current Legal Posture on PAD is Outdated and
Does Not Adequately Protect an Individual’s Interests
Rhode Island’s common law and statutes pertaining to the
issue of PAD should be repealed and replaced because they are
inadequate in a crucial way—they are antiquated and contrary to
the public interest.54 Current state law expressly prohibits a
patient’s right to choose PAD.55 In 1996, Rhode Island adopted a
statute specifically prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.56 The
Rhode Island General Assembly promulgated legislative findings
that the welfare of Rhode Island citizens requires, “vulnerable
persons be protected from suicide and that the cost to the
taxpayers of enforcing laws preventing assisted suicides will be
reduced by promoting civil enforcement of such laws.”57 These
50. See Lindsay N. McAneeley, Comment, Physician Assisted Suicide:
Expanding the Laboratory to the State of Hawai’i, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 269,
275–76 (2006).
51. Christina White, Comment, Physician Aid-In-Dying, 53 HOUS. L.
REV. 595, 610, 610 & n.126 (2015).
52. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1213, 1215 (Mont. 2009)
(affirming the lower court’s decision to permit physician-assisted suicide but
rejecting the constitutional analysis and relying on the consent statute as a
defense to a charge of homicide).
53.
PROCON, State-by-State Guide to Physician-Assisted Suicide,
https://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132
(last
visited Mar. 14, 2018).
54.
In fact, Rhode Island currently considers suicide a felony and the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has expressly deemed it as such. Clift v.
Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805 (R.I. 1996) (citing In re Marlene
B., 540 A.2d 1028, 1029 (R.I. 1988)).
55. See, e.g., 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-3 (2002).
56. See id.
57. § 11-60-1; see H.B. 8244, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1996); S.B. 2558,
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legislative findings led to the enactment of the Prevention of
Assisted Suicide Act, which, in effect, made PAD illegal in Rhode
Island.58
A physician violates this statute if he or she “knowingly . . .
[p]rovides the physical means by which another person commits or
attempts to commit suicide; or . . . [p]articipates in a physical act
by which another person commits or attempts to commit
suicide . . . .”59 Notably, in order to commit the foregoing, the
physician must do so “with the purpose of assisting another person
to commit suicide . . . .”60 While on its face this legislation
appears to prohibit licensed healthcare practitioners from
providing another person with the physical means to commit
suicide, a closer reading reveals that there is a requisite mens rea
for the commission of this crime: that the physician acts
“knowingly” and with “purpose.”61 While the mens rea
requirement may insulate doctors from liability because the state
bears the burden of proving state of mind, this element still poses
the risk of deterring doctors from implementing vigorous medical
treatment in fear that their intentions will be misunderstood.62
The prosecution must prove a physician’s intent to cause death
and not just his intent to act; yet, if a doctor’s actions result in
death, that intent is left to the subjectivity of jurors to decide.63
While this is only a possible risk, it certainly is not in a patient’s
best interest for doctors to be hesitant in making medical
decisions.64
Moreover, the ban on assisted suicide does not apply to a
licensed physician who “administers, prescribes, or dispenses
medications or procedures to relieve another person’s pain or
discomfort, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or
increase the risk of death,” so long as the measures taken were not
intended to cause death.65 This permits physicians to give

1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1996).
58. § 11-60-3 (statutorily stating physicians assisted death is illegal).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id.
62. Editorial, Stay Out, PROVIDENCE J., July 25, 1996, at B-06.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. § 11-60-4.
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medication to patients with terminal conditions when the primary
purpose of giving that medication is to alleviate pain,
notwithstanding whether or not the medication is so powerful as
to hasten death.66 Notably, the American Medical Association
endorses administering pain-killing medication to terminally ill
patients to prevent excruciating pain, even when it is known that
this act will advance the time of death.67 The ability to deny the
requisite intent to commit this crime creates readily available
defenses and mitigating arguments for a physician to refute a
possible charge.68
The problem with this law is that the difference between
“intending” to alleviate pain while also “knowing” it may cause
death, as opposed to “knowingly” treating a patient for the
“purpose” of causing death, may be unclear.69 Doctors are
committed to their patients and may want to respect their decision
to die with dignity, even though they may not do so under Rhode
Island law.70 Physicians in Rhode Island now have the ability to
engage in PAD under the guise that the purpose for the fatal dose
of medication was merely to alleviate pain.71 Thus, some doctors
may get away with violating the law by saying that they did not
intend to cause death, even though they knew death could be a
result.72 On the other hand, this provision may result in
physicians withholding heavy doses of pain-relieving morphine—
which can hasten a terminally ill person’s death—in fear that
their actions will be interpreted as illegally helping patients end
their lives, when the true intent was to relieve burdensome
pain.73 With punishment of up to ten-years in prison looming
over their heads, it seems unlikely that physicians would
jeopardize their careers and freedom on the subjective analyses of
witnesses, prosecutors, and jurors.74 Thus, doctors may avoid
66. See id.
67. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 750–51 (1997).
68. See id.
69. See § 11-60-4.
70. See id. § 11-60-4; see also Felice J. Freyer, Doctors confront assisted
suicide: The Rhode Island Medical Society will decide next week whether to
support physician-assisted suicide, PROVIDENCE J., May 9, 1996, at A-1.
71. See § 11-60-4.
72. See id.
73. Stay Out, supra note 62.
74. See id.
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alleviating pain altogether because they fear that they could be
prosecuted or convicted.75 It is overtly against the public interest
to have doctors who are overly-paranoid in performing their
duties.76 Either way, the subjective standard is problematic
because in medical practice, as opposed to law books, the
difference between the two mental states is nearly impossible to
distinguish.77
Accordingly, passing laws that prohibit PAD in Rhode Island
did not come without substantial pushback from the public—
including doctors, patients, lawyers, and politicians.78 Doctors are
bound by the Hippocratic Oath to “do no harm,” yet, many
patients and doctors in Rhode Island believe that allowing a
patient to suffer the indignities of the final stages of a terminal
illness is doing just that: doing harm.79 Around the time these
laws came into effect, a Brown University bioethicist stated
“[p]eople want to know this assistance will be available, . . . even
though the vast majority will never come to want it.”80 PAD
imposes no obligation on patients or doctors to hasten death; to
take that opportunity and choice away does not respect an
individual’s interests, beliefs, or wishes.81

75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 750–51 (1997).
A doctor who fails to administer medical treatment to one who is
dying from a disease could be doing so with an intent to harm or kill
that patient. Conversely, a doctor who prescribes lethal medication
does not necessarily intend the patient’s death—rather that doctor
may seek simply to ease the patient’s suffering and to comply with
her wishes. The illusory character of any differences in intent or
causation is confirmed by the fact that the American Medical
Association unequivocally endorses the practice of terminal
sedation—the administration of sufficient dosages of pain-killing
medication to terminally ill patients to protect them from
excruciating pain even when it is clear that the time of death will be
advanced.
Id.
78. See Freyer, supra note 70.
79. Id.
80. Id. “Bioethics” is defined as “the discipline dealing with the ethical
implications of biological research and applications especially in medicine.”
Bioethics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/bioethics (last visited Mar. 14, 2018).
81. See Freyer, supra note 70.
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Those provisions of the Rhode Island General Laws relating to
PAD that were enacted over twenty years ago no longer comport
with individual interests or the nation’s emerging trends on
PAD.82 It would be more effective to adopt carefully-constructed
legislation that allow for PAD in very limited circumstances,
which would accomplish the dual purpose of protecting an
individual’s interest in making choices about his or her body,
while also balancing the state’s interest in preserving life and
protecting vulnerable groups.83
B. Rhode Island Should Enact a Statute That Protects an
Individual’s Interest in Autonomy While Establishing Procedural
Safeguards Against Abuse
The most effective means by which to effectuate PAD is
through the legislative process because this allows for more
extensive fact-finding, continual development of proposed
provisions, concentrated refinement throughout the drafting
process, and an opportunity for meaningful commentary from
interest groups and litigators.84 Passing a statute would provide
a more flexible procedure, as opposed to the restrictions
incorporated with ballot-initiative measures or court orders,
where any fine-tuning would then come on an ad hoc basis.85
Strong autonomy interests and maintaining control over the
destiny of one’s body weigh in favor of the right to PAD as an
option.86 Indeed, many terminally-ill patients view the “death
82. See supra Part I.B.
83. See infra Part II.B.1.
84. Tucker, The Death with Dignity Movement, supra note 44, at 931.
85. Id.
86. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1126. Religious arguments are beyond the
scope of this Comment. However, it is worth noting that the Catholic Church
is one of the greatest opponents against the recent “aid in dying” legislation
and has contributed a great deal of financial resources to support its stance
in an effort to defeat bills of this kind. See Kathryn L. Tucker, When Dying
Takes Too Long: Activism for Social Change to Protect and Expand Choice at
the End of Life, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 109, 123 (2011) [hereinafter Tucker,
When Dying Takes Too Long]. Recent data also found that as of 2015, fortyfour percent of the Rhode Island population identified as Catholic, which was
the second highest percentage in the United States; thus, Catholic resistance
to PAD legislation will likely hinder progress in Rhode Island. See Ana
Swanson, Chart: The United States of Catholics and Protestant, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
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with dignity” movement to be about control.87 Furthermore, while
opponents of PAD have concerns that families may coerce or put
undue pressure on a terminally ill family member to opt for PAD,
social interests actually support the right to PAD, particularly
because there is no substantive evidence to support a finding that
coercion is an issue in practice.88 The risks of PAD legislation
that concern opponents of the right can be effectively addressed
through procedural safeguards written into carefully composed
legislation.89 A blanket prohibition against PAD
actively
obstructs the autonomy interest in providing an option for those
who seek a compassionate death.
1. Individual Interests and State Interests Are Adequately Served
by Procedures and Safeguards That Ensure Vulnerable Groups
Are Protected from Coercion and Undue Pressure When Opting for
PAD
Rhode Island should adopt a tightly crafted PAD statute
containing strict procedural safeguards because it would be an
effective method to balance an individual’s interest in personal
autonomy and compassionate care against the state’s interest in
protecting vulnerable groups and preserving life. PAD should be
allowed for terminally ill patients who are deemed capable and
competent, whose condition has a confirmed prognosis of resulting
in death within six months or less, and who have participated in
multiple evaluations by at least two treating physicians.90
Further, the patient should be required to make two oral requests
for PAD separated by a period of at least fifteen days and should
make a subsequent written request in the presence of two
wonk/wp/2015/03/04/chart-the-united-states-of-catholics-and-protestants/
?utm_term=.c1c1dfd2dad4.
87. See White, supra note 51, at 596 & n.8.
88. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act 2017 Data Summary, OR. HEALTH
AUTH., PUB.
HEALTH
DIV.
10,
11
(Feb.
9,
2018),
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/providerpartnerresources/evaluationresearch/
deathwithdignityact/Pages/ar-index.aspx. Coercion is a serious concern from
a public policy standpoint, however, data suggests that procedural safeguards
effectively combat the risk of coercion; notably, there is a lack of substantive
evidence showing otherwise. See infra Part II.B.3.
89. McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 270.
90. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800–.995 (West, Westlaw
through Jan. 1, 2018).
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witnesses to ensure competency and absence of coercion.91
Physicians should be required to inform the patient of feasible
alternatives, and request that the patient notify his or her next of
kin.92 This proposal properly serves the patient’s autonomy
interests while preventing abuse.93
The state has a legitimate interest in protecting the elderly,
as a vulnerable group, from abuse, neglect, coercion and
mistake.94 A concern is that PAD will create a risk of undue
influence in end-of-life choices, specifically that individuals whose
well-being and autonomy are already weakened by advanced age
might opt for PAD to spare their families of the financial burdens
involved with health-care and the emotional trauma of watching
their loved one die.95 This state interest is especially relevant in
Rhode Island because it has a substantial aging population which
continues to grow.96 A recent Rhode Island Department of
Human Services report ranked Rhode Island fourth in the nation
in the per capita elderly population.97 As people age, they become
more susceptible to disease and disability; thus, a rise in the
elderly population in Rhode Island will likely result in a dramatic
increase in terminally ill patients.98 Elderly patients have a
personal interest in choosing PAD because it allows them the
opportunity to exercise self-determination and offers a “more
humane option to those seeking a compassionate death.”99
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Emily P. Hughes, Note, The Oregon Death with Dignity Act:
Relief of Suffering at the End of Medicine’s Ability to Heal, 95 GEO. L.J. 207,
209 (2006).
94. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997).
95. Id. at 732.
96.
Maureen Maigret, Aging in Community: Executive Summary Report
June 2016, SUBCOMM. OF THE LONG TERM CARE COORDINATING COUNCIL 2
(June 2016), http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Reports/AginginComm%20Exec%20
SummaryFinal.pdf.
97.
Rhode Island’s Senior Population . . . By the Numbers, R.I. DIV. OF
ELDERLY AFF. (2006), http://www.dea.ri.gov/stats/ (finding Rhode Island had
117,391 residents aged seventy and older, and 82,292 residents aged seventyfive and older).
98.
Research Involving Elderly Or Terminally Ill Subjects, VA. POLYTECH.
INST. INSTITUTIONAL REV. BD., http://www.irb.vt.edu/pages/elderly.htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2017).
99.
Katherine A. Chamberlain, Note, Looking for a “Good Death”: The
Elderly Terminally Ill’s Right to Die by Physician-Assisted Suicide, 17 ELDER
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Although the state’s asserted interest in prohibiting PAD is to
protect vulnerable groups from coercion and abuse, these interests
may not be as significant in every context or set of
circumstances.100 While Rhode Island common law states that
preventing suicide because of depression and coercion is a
legitimate state interest,101 terminally ill patients who are
deemed competent and are seeking PAD on a voluntary basis may
pose only a modicum of risk of coercion.102 The state interest in
preventing abuse of vulnerable groups is satisfied if the patient
requesting PAD is not a victim of abuse or suffering from mental
illness.103 Justice Stevens in his Glucksberg concurrence
acknowledged that in these instances, “the State’s legitimate
interest in preventing abuse does not apply to an individual who is
not victimized by abuse, who is not suffering from depression, and
who makes a rational and voluntary decision to seek assistance in
dying.”104 Beyond this, to support and comply with the state’s
interest in protecting vulnerable groups, a PAD statute in Rhode
Island should be tightly drafted with language providing for
multiple professional checks as to the competency of a patient to
reduce the risk of depression-triggered PAD.105 Diagnosing
depression and recognizing a coerced patient is not an easy task,
but hospitals’ staff include mental health workers and other
professionals whose primary purpose is to work with terminally ill
patients to help them cope with physical and emotional pain, and
assess all of their treatment options.106 These checks for
competency and voluntariness allow for a patient to exercise
autonomy over his or her body, while still protecting the state’s
interest in safeguarding against coercion.107

L.J. 61, 80 (2009) (quoting Glen R. McMurry, Comment, An Unconstitutional
Death: The Oregon Death with Dignity Act’s Prohibition Against SelfAdministered Lethal Injection, 32 DAYTON L. REV. 441, 456 (2007)).
100. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-1 (2002).
101.
Laurie v. Senecal, 666 A.2d 806, 808 (R.I. 1995). The Rhode Island
Supreme Court emphasized that it “generally accept[s] that the state has an
interest in preserving life and preventing suicide.” Id. (citations omitted).
102.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 747 (1997).
103.
See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
104.
Id. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring).
105.
McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 275–80.
106.
Quill, 521 U.S. at 809 (Stevens, J., concurring).
107.
See McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 275–80.
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PAD legislation, if properly drafted, will advance an
individual’s interest while still appreciating the state’s interest.
Studies from the states where PAD is legally permitted show that
proper legislation will safeguard vulnerable groups from
coercion.108 For example, Oregon requires a patient to
be
suffering from terminal illness, deemed competent, and
voluntarily express an informed desire to end his or her life on
multiple occasions with timing requirements in order to qualify for
PAD.109 Importantly, the aforementioned elements must be
confirmed by a second physician, and multiple requests
strengthen the physicians’ surety of voluntary desire for PAD all
the more, thus, further safeguarding patients from coercion into
choosing PAD.110 The elderly’s personal interest in exercising a
right to PAD is compatible with the state’s interests in preserving
life and preventing suicide because legislation would contain
safeguards to properly regulate PAD, without undermining the
state’s interest.111
Ultimately, an individual’s right to personal autonomy and
dignity justifies legalizing PAD, but the state’s interests in
protecting its citizens and preserving life consistently serves as a
roadblock.112 Passing a carefully constructed PAD statute is a
valid way to balance these interests because it recognizes the
state’s interest through procedural safeguards, but also takes into
consideration dire cases of terminally ill patients and allows them
to opt for PAD.113 The state’s interest is neither implicated nor
furthered by a blanket prohibition on PAD when valid eligibility
and procedural requirements, such as those mentioned above, are

108.
Chamberlain, supra note 99, at 84. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
127.805 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2018).
109.
Chamberlain, supra note 99, at 86.
110.
Id.
111.
Id. at 84; see Lisa R. Hasday, The Hippocratic Oath as Literary Text:
A Dialogue Between Law and Medicine, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS
299, 302 (2002); see also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790,
793–94 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding the integrity of the medical field is not
compromised by doctors having a right to assist terminally ill patients in
opting to die when appropriate), overruled by Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997).
112.
McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 293–95.
113.
Id.
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in place.114 PAD would merely afford an available option to those
seeking to end their suffering with compassionate death.115
2. Legalizing PAD in Rhode Island is Consistent with a
Physician’s Role as a Healer and Does Not Undermine the Medical
Profession
The medical industry in Rhode Island will be able to adapt to
the legalization of PAD without losing its integrity. United States
Supreme Court doctrine maintains that a person has a right to
autonomy, bodily integrity, and control of his own body;
specifically, this principle has been extended to include autonomy
in medical decision making.116 The law—as well as medicine—is
constantly changing and evolving, and “experience shows that
most doctors can readily adapt to a changing legal climate.”117 It
is assumed that medical professionals will engage in these
permitted practices only when deemed appropriate in their
medical opinion, and that the integrity of the medical profession
will be maintained.118 Accordingly, allowing PAD in Rhode Island
would likely bring about a similar result: doctors could perform
PAD in compliance with procedural requirements when
appropriate, and the integrity of the medical profession would be
unharmed.119
Rhode Island should adopt a law allowing a terminally ill
patient to opt for PAD because incorporating deference to patient
autonomy reflects a nuanced perception of the goals of medicine
and the Hippocratic Oath.120 The goals of medicine are predicated
114. See McMurry, Comment, supra note 99, at 456.
115. Id.
116. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); see
also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
117. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 829–30 (9th Cir.
1996). For example, following Roe v. Wade’s holding that a woman has a
constitutional right to an abortion, the nation saw the medical profession
quickly adapt and begin performing abortions with the ethical integrity of the
profession remaining intact. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
118. See id. at 830. The court granted doctors the right to PAD on the
ground that “doctors would engage in the permitted practice when
appropriate, and that the integrity of the medical profession would survive
without blemish.” Id. (dismissing the Oath’s implicit prohibition on
physician-assisted suicide).
119. See id.
120. Hughes, Note, supra note 93, at 209.
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on the Hippocratic Oath—the famous maxim “do no harm”—and a
doctor’s role as a healer.121 A terminally ill patient is almost
intuitively in discord with a doctor’s role as healer because he or
she, by definition, cannot be healed.122 At the end of medicine’s
ability to heal, PAD provides an option that would relieve a
patient’s suffering when that is his or her ultimate wish.123 When
there is no other alternative to relieve that pain, PAD is a
legitimate way to further the medical goal of relieving patients
from suffering and undue pain, so long as it is autonomously
requested.124 PAD is consistent with the maxim “do no harm”
because the patient knows his or her own limits, and it allows
willing physicians to relieve suffering while respecting their
patient’s autonomy.125 The patient is the only one physically
feeling pain—not the physician, and especially not policymakers.126 Thus, when a patient is diagnosed with a terminal
disease that will inevitably result in death, the law ought to allow
a physician to respect and defer to the patient’s autonomous
choice about his or her own dying process.127
Furthermore, PAD legislation merely provides an option for
physicians willing to perform the procedure; legalizing PAD in
Rhode Island would impose no legal obligation or duty on the
physician to engage in such practice.128 Therefore, no medical
professional would be required to act in disagreement with his or
her own moral beliefs or his best medical opinion.129 Similarly,
the physicians who do consider PAD to be consistent with their
ethical beliefs and role as healer would be allowed to engage in
such assistance.130 PAD allows individuals to exercise their
121. Id. at 209 & n.5, 225. Medical professionals take the Hippocratic
Oath, swearing to “‘keep [the sick] from harm and injustice’ and promise that
they themselves will ‘remain. . .free of all intentional injustice.’” Hasday,
supra note 111, at 302 (alterations in original).
122. Terminally
ill,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terminally%20ill (last visited
May 6, 2018); see Hughes, Note, supra note 93, at 225.
123. McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 270.
124. Id.
125. See Hughes, Note, supra note 93, at 235.
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 210.
129. See id.
130. See id.
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autonomy and doctors to exercise their medical opinions without
placing any obligations or imposing any moral judgments on
others. Since the legalization of PAD allows terminally ill
individuals to make autonomous decisions about their life that
comply with their own morals and beliefs, and the prohibition of
PAD restricts the rights of individuals by disallowing patients and
doctors to exercise their own morals and ethics and imposing the
beliefs of others upon them, legalization of PAD ought to
prevail.131
Thus, Rhode Island should legalize PAD because it is not only
consistent with the sentiment of the Hippocratic Oath and the
purpose of medicine, but safeguards in the statute also respect
and defer to a physician’s moral and ethical beliefs by making
PAD an option, not an obligation.
3. Tightly Crafted Legislation Can Appropriately and
Successfully Safeguard Against Perceived Risks and Feared
Abuses of PAD
Nineteen years of data collected and analyzed by the Oregon
Health Authority’s Public Health Division (Public Health
Division) supports the contention that carefully drafted legislation
containing adequate procedural safeguards can serve to prevent,
or at least substantially mitigate, the risk of abuse or coercion
with respect to PAD.132 While opponents of PAD charge that it
will be forced upon vulnerable patients (e.g., poor, uninsured,
uneducated, elderly), data suggests the contrary.133 PAD in
Oregon is used primarily by individuals with a baccalaureate
education or higher.134 Notably, higher levels of education
positively correlate to a higher percent of people who invoke PAD,
with individuals who have a bachelor’s or higher who opt for PAD
being forty percent more than those without a high school
diploma.135 Further, since the DWDA’s enactment in 1997, over
131. Id. at 210, 235; McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 283.
132. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act Data summary 2016, OR. HEALTH
AUTH., PUB. HEALTH DIV. 4, 7 (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.oregon.gov/
oha/PH/providerpartnerresources/evaluationresearch/deathwithdignityact/Do
cuments/year19.pdf [hereinafter Nineteenth Annual Report].
133. Id. at 8–9; see McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 280–81.
134. Nineteenth Annual Report, supra note 132, at 8.
135. Id. at 8, tbl. 1 (showing that after DWDA’s enactment in 1997, 46%
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ninety percent of patients using PAD were enrolled in hospice care
and over ninety-eight percent of those patients had healthcare
insurance.136 A patient with health insurance is less likely to be
subjected to coercion because their continued treatment is not
costly to the family.
While there is a gradually increasing trend of patients who
opt for PAD each year, the number of patients exercising this
option remains minimal; in 2016, there were only 204 DWDA
prescription recipients in all of Oregon.137 This does not mean
that all the prescription recipients ingested the drugs; in fact, the
Public Health Division reported only 133 people who passed away
due to ingesting the prescribed medications.138 Additionally,
DWDA requires at least fifteen days to elapse between the
patient’s initial request and the writing of the prescription for the
medication, and the median reported time between the initial
request and actual death was fifty-six days in 2016.139 Allowing a
patient time to understand his or her options and confirm his or
her decision without rushing the patient is general practice as a
procedural safeguard in PAD statutes, and the prolonged time
frame demonstrates that patients truly contemplated the
decision.140
The Oregon reports also show that terminally ill patients
typically experience many end-of-life concerns, the most
prominent being loss of autonomy, decreased ability to engage in
enjoyable activities, and loss of dignity.141 With an integral part
of autonomy and dignity being the ability to make one’s own
of those who opted for PAD had a bachelor’s degree or higher; 27% had some
college-level education; 22% graduated from high school; and only 6% had
less than a high school degree).
136. Id. (showing that 54% of patients had private healthcare coverage,
and 44.6% had Medicare, Medicaid or other governmental insurance).
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id. at 5.
139. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.850 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2018);
Nineteenth Annual Report, supra note 132, at 11.
140. Peter G. Daniels, An Illinois Physician-Assisted Suicide Act: A
Merciful End to a Terminally Ill Criminal Tradition, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 763,
779–80 (1997).
141. Nineteenth Annual Report, supra note 132, at 10 (according to cited
patient responses from 1997 to 2016: 91.4% feared loss of autonomy; 89.7%
feared decreased ability to engage in activities; and 77% feared loss of
dignity).

520 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:499
personal decisions, the ability of a patient to be a part of his own
end-of-life choices and decide when “enough is enough”
demonstrates value in that patient’s autonomy.142 Therefore, the
DWDA serves to alleviate some of a terminally ill patient’s
concerns by incorporating respect for his or her autonomy and
giving it deference.
In addition, Vermont recently assigned a legislative
commission to review Oregon’s experience since passing the
DWDA.143 The resulting report concluded, “it is quite apparent
from credible sources in and out of Oregon that the Death with
Dignity Act has not had an adverse impact on end-of-life care and
in all probability has enhanced the other options.”144 The
Vermont study made no mention of abuse, coercion, or misuse of
the policy.145 Notably, during 2016, no referrals were made to the
Oregon Medical Board for failure to comply with DWDA
requirements.146
Oregon’s successful experience with PAD legislation does not
necessarily translate to Rhode Island having an equivalent
experience if it were to adopt a similar death with dignity law.
However, stringent procedural safeguards within the PAD
legislation would adequately serve to alleviate coercion in Rhode
Island.147 In addition to imposing specific restrictions on the
requesting patient, PAD legislation would require the physician to
comply with a number of procedures as well, mainly pertaining to
documentation and diagnoses.148

142. McAneeley, Comment, supra note 50, at 290, 292.
143. See Robin Lunge et al., Death with Dignity Law and Euthanasia in
the Netherlands: Factual Disputes, VT. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 2–3 (2004),
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/04Death/Death_With_Dignity_
Report.htm.
144. See id. at 24.
145. See id.
146. Nineteenth Annual Report, supra note 132, at 8.
These
requirements include two oral requests separated by fifteen days, a written
request in the presence of two witnesses, confirmation of the diagnosis and
prognosis, determination that patient is capable and competent, informing
the patient of feasible alternatives, and requesting the patient notify his or
her next of kin. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.810, .815, .820, .840 (West,
Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2018).
147. See Lunge et al., supra note 143.
148. H.R. 7297, 2018 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2018).
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C. A Proposed Bill in Rhode Island Possesses Adequate
Procedural Safeguards Against Coercion and Effectively Balances
an Individual’s Interest in Autonomy with the State’s Interest in
Preserving Life
While Rhode Island law explicitly prohibits PAD, the state
has previously proposed legislation that would allow for certain
medical patients to choose to end their life, stemming from the
mid-to-late nineties through 2018.149 For example, in 1998, a bill
was introduced that called to repeal laws prohibiting PAD and,
instead, would authorize and regulate it.150
The Lila Mansfield Sapinsley Compassionate Care Act
(LMSCCA), introduced to the Rhode Island General Assembly on
January 25, 2018, is an example of well-crafted legislation that
Rhode Island should pass.151 This initiative demonstrates that
carefully drafted legislation could appropriately safeguard against
perceived risks and feared abuses of PAD.152 The LMSCCA
reflects changes in public perceptions over the last two decades by
replacing “suicide” with the term “compassionate care.”153 This
law would provide a legal mechanism whereby a terminally ill
patient may choose to end his or her life using drugs prescribed by
a physician.154 Under the proposed legislation, doctors who
engage in PAD and prescribe lethal prescriptions to terminally ill
149. See, e.g., H.R. 7918, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1996); H.R. 7918,
1998 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1998); H.R. 5507, 2015 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2015).
150. H.R. 7918 (1998) §§ 11-60-3, -4; Id. § 23-71-1.
151. H.R. 7297, 2018 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2018). The bill is named the
“Lila Manfield Sapinsley Compassionate Care Act” in honor of the former
state senator who died in 2014. She was working to craft the legislation
when she died. Jennifer Bogdan, Bill in R.I. General Assembly would let
terminally ill control death, PROVIDENCE J. (Apr. 8, 2015 11:15, PM),
http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20150408/NEWS/150409326.
152. H.R. 7297.
153. Id; see H.R. 7927. Rhode Island has rebranded “suicide” and the
“death with dignity” and “end of life option” terminology used in other states’
legislation with the term “compassionate care.” Id.; see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 127.800–.890 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2018). The term
“suicide” is often associated with one who is suffering from despair and
irrationally takes one’s own life. See also Straton, supra note 1, at 476. A
terminally ill patient is looking towards imminent and unavoidable death, so,
removing the term “suicide” from the current legislation creates a more
accurate dialogue on the issue. Id.
154. H.R. 7297.
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patients would be immune from civil or criminal liability, as well
as professional disciplinary action, as long as all procedural
safeguards stated in the statute are precisely followed.155
Physicians, however, could not be forced to prescribe lethal
medication to terminally ill patients under the law; physicians are
under no duty of law to participate in PAD.156 Further, health
care facilities would also have the right to prohibit physicians
from prescribing lethal drugs to patients under their care.157
These provisions defer to hospitals and physicians who may not
want to partake in PAD by imposing no obligation, but rather,
allowing the option.158
Furthermore, the LMSCCA sets strict guidelines for when a
patient can request PAD.159 It requires the patient to have a
prognosis of a “terminal condition,” meaning an “incurable and
irreversible disease which would, within reasonable medical
judgment, result in death within six months or less”;160 this
prognosis must be confirmed by a second doctor.161 Other bills
have allowed for patients with particularly burdensome pain to
fall within the PAD statute’s bounds, but the LMSCCA avoids
scenarios where a prognosis may ultimately be too hard to
consistently measure, such as chronic illnesses where the lifeexpectancy varies.162 Employing a strict requisite standard for a
prognosis of terminally ill with six months to live may seem
stringent, but it is easy to measure with a higher degree of
certainty. Also, a physician must determine that the patient is
capable of making an informed decision, the decision is voluntary,
and the patient intends to take medication for the purpose of
hastening death.163
The LMSCCA also incorporates mechanisms that greatly
reduce the chance of coercion, as its opponents charge.164 The
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. § 23-4.13-3(a).
Id. § 23-4.13-5(a).
Id. § 23-4.13-6.
Id.
Id. § 23-4.13.
Id. § 23-4.13-2(8), (10).
Id. § 23-4.13-3(a)(7).
H.R. 7918, Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1998).
H.R. 7297 § 23-4.13-3(a)(5).
Steve Ahlquist, Talking about end-of-life options in Rhode Island, RI
FUTURE (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.rifuture.org/end-of-life-options-ri/.
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LMSCCA is virtually identical to the Oregon Death with Dignity
Act insofar as which patients qualify to choose PAD and the
procedural restraints imposed on the patient and physician.165
The most significant difference in the two acts is that Oregon’s Act
does not require the patient to self-administer the drugs, whereas
the LMSCCA explicitly requires self-administration.166 The
added requirement that a terminally ill patient administer the
medication themselves provides an additional procedural
safeguard, allowing further surety that the patient willfully and
intentionally ended his or her life.167
The LMSCCA requires the terminally ill patient to verbally
request to be prescribed medication that can be self-administered
for the purpose of hastening his or her death in the physical
presence of a physician.168 After the initial request, a patient
must make a second request in the physical presence of the same
physician no fewer than fifteen days after the first oral request.169
At the time of the second request, the physician must offer the
patient the opportunity to rescind the request.170 The fifteen-day
waiting period and additional inquiry by the physician act as
procedural safeguards to ensure competency and sureness of the
patient.171 In addition to the oral requests, the patient must
make a third, written and signed request to be prescribed the
medication to self-administer for the purpose of hastening
death.172 In order to significantly reduce the risk of coercion, this
written confirmation requires two witnesses, and at least one of
those witnesses must be a disinterested party.173
165. H.R. 7297. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800–.995 (West, Westlaw
through Jan. 1, 2018).
166. Id.; see also White, supra note 51, at 610 n.126.
167. H.R. 7297.
168. Id. § 23-4.13-3(a)(1).
169. Id. § 23-4.13-3(a)(2).
170. Id. § 23-4.13-3(a)(3).
171. Daniels, supra note 140, at 779 (acknowledging the general practice
in aid in dying statutes of prescribing a minimum amount of time a patient
must wait between his first and second requests).
172. H.R. 7297 § 23-4.13-3(a)(4).
173. See id.; see also § 23-4.13-2 (defining an interested person as the
patient’s physician, a person who is a relative of the patient by blood or by
law, a person who knows that they would be entitled, upon the patient’s
death, to any portion of the estate or assets, or an owner, operator, or
employee of the health care facility where the patient is being treated).
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While the LMSCCA prescribes numerous procedural
safeguards and eligibility requirements for the patient and
physician to comply with if both parties decide PAD is an option, it
imposes no obligation on a patient to opt for PAD and no legal
duty on a health-care facility or individual physician to perform
PAD.174 Accordingly, neither the patient or physician would be
bound to act contrary to their morals and beliefs.175
The proposed legislation should be passed because it contains
adequate procedural safeguards that provide an effective way to
balance state interests with individual rights, is consistent with
United States Supreme Court decisions, and is supported by
sound policy justifications. The LMSCCA has been referred to the
House Health, Education & Welfare Committee.176
CONCLUSION

Rhode Island should allow for PAD in very specific instances
related to terminally ill patients. The United States Supreme
Court permits the states to be the laboratories of PAD legislation
and many states have begun to do so, evidencing a change in
public sentiment regarding PAD on a national level. Rhode
Island’s current legal posture on the issue is outdated and
operates against an individual’s best interests; PAD legislation in
Rhode Island would be an effective way to balance the state’s
interest in preserving life and preventing suicide with an
individual’s right to autonomy and relief from undue pain and
suffering. PAD comports with a physician’s role as healer and
poses no threat to the integrity of the medical community. Also,
data suggests that adequate procedural safeguards are successful
in preventing coercion in practice. The recent sustained activity
in the Rhode Island General Assembly demonstrates that there is
momentum and enthusiasm in addressing this issue. The
LMSCCA is a great example of legislation that contains adequate
procedural safeguards; it places no obligation on the patient or the
physician to engage in practices that do not comport with his or
174. H.R. 7297 § 23-4.13-5(a)–(c).
175. See id.
176. H.B. 7297. The bill’s primary sponsor is Edith Ajello, Representative
for District 1 of Providence, Rhode Island. Representatives Ajello, O’Grady,
Knight, Carson, and Donovan introduced the bill on January 25, 2018. See
id.
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her own ethical beliefs, but leaves the option available for an
individual to make an autonomous decision that complies with his
or her own morals and beliefs.

